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Abstract 
This paper examines optimal cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes for the case in which a polluting 
input is used to produce an internationally-traded ﬁnished product. The model allows for terms-of-trade effects 
under oligopoly and employs a general speciﬁcation of the environmental damage function that encompasses 
special cases of local, global, and transboundary externalities. The model has several implications for public 
ﬁnance. For example, inefﬁciently high environmental taxes may be optimal for a net exporting country in non­
cooperative circumstances, as the motive to shift rent by selecting an inefﬁciently low tax rate is countervailed 
by the incentive to shift the burden of the tax to foreign consumers. The ﬁndings identify the important role of 
asymmetric trade ﬂows (denominated in both goods and pollution exchange) in determining optimal cooperative 
and non-cooperative tax policy under oligopoly. 
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1. Introduction 
The potential use of taxes to internalize environmental externalities is a thoroughly inves­
tigated topic in all major industrialized countries. The OECD, the WTO, the European 
Commission, and other international organizations are currently evaluating possible envi­
ronmental tax reforms and their effect on national and regional welfare and competitiveness 
(see Morgenstern, 1995; OECD, 1997). An obstacle to environmental tax reforms, however, 
is the inherent tension between facilitating freer international trade ﬂows and allowing in­
dividual nations the authority to set unilateral, and perhaps non-harmonized, environmental 
policies. 
It is clear that national environmental policies can undermine free trade. The idea that 
environmental policy can be used as a potential rent-shifting device in international settings 
has received considerable attention in the strategic trade literature. Recent contributions 
to this literature have been made by Conrad (1993), Barrett (1994), and Kennedy (1994), 
who consider environmental policy in a conventional strategic trade framework in which 
a polluting industry in each of two countries competes to export output to consumers in 
a third country.1 The general outcome of these models is what has become known as the 
“environmental dumping” effect: national regulators have an incentive to set equilibrium 
taxes below the Pigouvian level in non-cooperative trade contexts. It may be optimal to set an 
environmental tax below marginal external damage under international oligopoly, because, 
in the sense of Brander and Spencer (1985), the incentive to internalize pollution damages 
is tempered by the ability of a country to shift rent. As Kennedy (1994) demonstrates, 
moreover, the incentive for environmental dumping is intensiﬁed under circumstances of 
transboundary pollution. 
This paper extends the analysis of strategic environmental policy to consider market con­
ditions characterized by various forms of international asymmetry. As a point of departure 
from conventional, symmetric models of strategic trade, we introduce domestic consump­
tion within each production region and consider a general criterion for the distribution of 
the global consumer base. We also treat differences in production costs across countries and 
allow for alternative characterizations of transboundary pollution ﬂows. The introduction 
of asymmetries dimensioned in consumption, production, and environmental damage ﬂows 
allows us to assess the strategic trade implications of unbalanced trade in both goods and 
pollution. 
Our analysis differs from its precursors in several important regards. Unlike the situation 
considered by Conrad (1993), we allow for a variety of environmental effects, including 
local, global, and transboundary externalities. The framework also differs from Kennedy 
(1994) in that we consider asymmetric pollution diffusion across countries, which per­
mits, among other things, transboundary pollution situations with uni-directional system 
ﬂows.2 Finally, unlike Barrett (1994), we consider terms-of-trade effects and the commen­
surate dependence of environmental policy on both consumption- and production-distortion 
motivations. 
The general representation of transboundary pollution we develop also clariﬁes an im­
portant issue in the conceptual approach to international pollution problems. In particular, 
the model allows for a distinction to be made between pollution effects that are rival or non-
rival in nature, which underscores the question of whether environmental effects should be 
aggregated across countries in the manner of private or public goods. 
Our ﬁndings can be organized into several main results. In the cooperative equilibrium, we 
ﬁnd that the optimal tax policy under asymmetric-cost oligopoly does not involve harmo­
nized tax rates across countries.3 For all other forms of asymmetry, however, in particular for 
differences in the relative consumer base or in the share of global pollution damages across 
countries, we demonstrate that policy harmonization is optimal in the cooperative equilib­
rium. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, we ﬁnd the selection of environmental policy to 
depend on three major inﬂuences: (i) a terms-of-trade effect; (ii) an imperfect competition 
effect; and (iii) a transboundary (or pollution leakage) effect. For transboundary externality 
problems, we ﬁnd that each country has an incentive to set its tax rate below the cooperative 
level regardless of whether it is a net importer or exporter of pollution. We also show that 
the non-cooperative tax rate depends in an important fashion on a country’s terms-of-trade. 
For a general distribution of the global consumer base, the ﬁnd that the motivation of the 
domestic country to capture oligopoly rent for its ﬁrms is countervailed by the desire of the 
regulator to shift the burden of the tax to foreign consumers. As a result, a net exporting 
(importing) country has an incentive to set higher (lower) environmental taxes than would 
be efﬁcient under cooperation. 
2. The Model 
Our study of international environmental regulations is framed by the following two-stage 
game.4 In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator in each country sets an emission tax on a polluting 
input and the tax rate set by each member of the trade union is revealed. In the second stage, 
ﬁrms treat the stage-one emission tax rates as parametric and play Cournot-Nash. 
The model is comprised of a two-country trade union that satisﬁes the following prop­
erties. Consumers in the union have identical preferences, regardless of their country of 
origin, although the size of each consumer market (i.e., the number of consumers in each 
country) may differ. Firms within each country are homogeneous and produce a single 
non-differentiated product with a polluting input. Across countries, however, production 
costs and the number of ﬁrms in each country may differ, as would be the case for countries 
that implement different domestic labor policies or have different resource and technolog­
ical endowments. Finally, intra-industry trade occurs between the two countries without 
transportation costs.5 
Consider the problem of a ﬁrm in country i . Let Ci (yi , q(ti )) denote the cost function of 
a representative ﬁrm in country i , where yi is output, ti is the domestic emission tax set in 
the preliminary stage of the game, and q(ti ) is the market price of the polluting input. The 
cost function is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable for the allowable range of 
yi , increasing (Cyi > 0) and convex (Cyi yi > 0). 
The input market price is described by the linear function 
q(ti ) = q0 + ti e, (1) 
where q0 is the base price of the polluting input and e is an emissions coefﬁcient that 
represents the quantity of emissions per unit of input. The value of e is taken to be identical 
for all ﬁrms; that is, we do not consider differences in abatement technology across countries. 
All other input prices are constant and are suppressed hereafter for notational simplicity. 
With homogeneous consumers and no transportation costs between countries in the trade 
union, it follows that a single market price prevails. Let P = P(Y ) denote the price of the 
consumer good. World consumption, Y , is then speciﬁed as 
Y = n1 y1 + n2 y2, (2) 
where y1 and y2 denote the output of a representative ﬁrm in country 1 and 2, respectively, 
and n1 and n2 are the number of ﬁrms that produce in each country. 
The optimal output choice of a ﬁrm is characterized as the solution to 
Max πi = P(Y )yi − Ci (yi , q(ti )), (3) yi 
which yields the following ﬁrst-order condition: 
P(Y ) + yi P �(Y ) = Cyi (yi , q(ti )). (4) 
∑ 
∑
Suppressing arguments, the second-order condition for a ﬁrm in country i is 
+ yi P ��2P � < Cyi yi . (5) 
Making use of expressions (1)–(4) and the demand condition, P = P(Y ), it is possible 
to express individual ﬁrm output as a function of the tax set in each country, such that 
y1 = f (t1, t2) and y2 = g(t1, t2). Totally differentiating equations (4), it can be easily veriﬁed 
(subject to the standard Routh-Hurwicz conditions on second differentials) that 
∂yi ∂y j





Expressions (6) and (7) complete the output stage of the model. We turn, next, to our 
speciﬁcation of environmental damages. 
3. Environmental Damage 
Let Di = D(Ei ) denote the environmental damage function, where Ei is the pollution level 
that contributes to damages in country i . For clarity, we consider the case in which damages 
increase with the level of pollution in each country, D� > 0, and marginal damage is constant, 
D�� = 0.6 
We employ a general speciﬁcation of environmental damages that encompasses various 
forms of transboundary pollution, including special cases of local, global and unidirectional 
externalities (as described below). Speciﬁcally, deﬁne Ei as 
N 
Ei = sij n j ex j (8) 
j=1 
j
where si ∈ (0, 1) is the share of total emissions produced in country j that contributes to 
environmental damage in country i , N is the number of countries, and x j is the quantity 
of polluting inputs used by ﬁrms in country j . The speciﬁcation of environmental damages 
in (8) is capable of application to externalities that are both rival and non-rival in their 
effects. The distinction between these types of effects turns out to be important for the 
global efﬁciency of environmental policy. 
Consider, ﬁrst, an externality that creates a purely rival external effect. For a rival effect, 
each unit of pollution that originates in country j creates external damage in either country 
i or country j , but not in both countries at once. Using the notation introduced in (8), the 
share of total pollution that originates in country j must satisfy iN =1 s j = 1. Examples of i 
a rival pollution effect include circumstances in which the pollutant becomes biologically 
ﬁxed, such as would be the case for health effects associated with carbon monoxide or 
pesticide consumption. 
At the other extreme, an externality may create a purely non-rival external effect. For a 
non-rival effect, each unit of pollution that originates in country j simultaneously creates 




case must satisfy i=1 s = N ; that is, s = 1, ∀i . There are numerous forms of externalities i i 
that create non-rival effects, of which global climate change from greenhouse gases is a 
leading example. 
In our two-country model, it is possible to specify any externality or combination of 
1 2 2 1externalities in (8) by choosing the appropriate elements of the set, S = (s1 , s1 , s2 , s2 ). 
In particular, expression (8) reduces to the case of a local externality, Di = D(niexi ), ∀i , 
when S = (1, 0, 1, 0), and to a non-rival global externality, Di = D(niexi + n jex j ), ∀i , 
when S = (1, 1, 1, 1).7 The pollution effect may also combine rival and non-rival compo­
nents. For example, if γ denotes the share of pollution that is non-rival in nature, then 
S = (1, γ, 1, γ) . 
Expression (8) also encompasses various forms of transboundary, or cross-border ex­
ternalities. In particular, a unidirectional externality may arise through the ﬂow of a river 
from one country to another, as in the case of U.S. agricultural production that contributes 
to salinity of the Colorado River at the Mexican border. Suppose, for the sake of clarity, 
that a chemical plant located in country 1 produces efﬂuent associated with a purely rival 
external effect. If the efﬂuent is released into a river that ﬂows from country 1 to country 
2, D1 = D(βn1ex1), and D2 = D((1 − β)n1ex1 + n2ex2), where the share of pollution 
that affects country 1, β ∈ (0, 1), is determined by the distance of the plant to the bor­
der and the oxygen sag curve associated with the type of efﬂuent released. In this case, 
S = (β, 0, 1, 1 − β). 
4. Optimal Emission Taxes in the Cooperative Case 
We now turn to the cooperative policy outcome.8 In cases where environmental decisions 
are made at the trade union level, the problem is equivalent to one in which countries coop­
eratively determine emission taxes to maximize joint welfare. The joint welfare maximum 
is completely characterized as the solution to 
Y ∑ 
Max WC = P(U ) dU − P(Y )Y + [ni (P(Y )yi − Ci (yi , q(ti )) + ti exi ) − D(Ei )], 
ti ,t j 0 i 
(9) 
where we have decomposed the problem into separate consumer surplus and producer 
surplus components for consistency with the non-cooperative formulation to follow. Using 
Shepard’s Lemma, Cq = xi , with (4), the ﬁrst-order condition of (9) with respect to ti is 
[ ( )] ∂yi [ ( )] ∂y j ∂yi ∂y ji i j jti − D� si + s j niexyi + t j − D� s j + si n jexy j = P � ni yi + n j y j , ∂ti ∂ti ∂ti ∂ti 
(10) 
where a similar condition holds for t j . The regulator’s optimal choice of the policy instru­
ments, t∗ and t∗ j , is found by solving these ﬁrst-order conditions simultaneously. i 
( ) ( ) From (12), the implicit cooperative tax-rule, tˆi , is given by j j ∂y j ∂y j ∂yi ∂y j ( ) s j + si n jexy j ∂ti n j t j exy j P � ni yi + n j y ji i ∂ti ∂ti ∂titˆi = si + s j D� + ∂yi D� − ∂yi + ∂yi , niexyi niexyi niexyi∂ti ∂ti ∂ti 
(11) 
where an equivalent expression holds for tˆ j . The cooperative tax-rule (11) depends on the 
marginal damage associated with production in country i , plus three additional terms: a 
foreign pollution effect, a foreign tax effect, and an imperfect competition effect, respec­
tively. The ﬁrst term, the foreign pollution effect, is negative by (6), which implies that the 
optimal tax in country i decreases with the effect of the tax on foreign production and pol­
lution. Because a tax in country i increases output in country j , the optimal tax in country 
i is set lower to account for the greater demand for polluting inputs, and the subsequent 
increase in pollution, by foreign ﬁrms. The second term, the foreign tax effect, is positive by 
(6), which indicates that the optimal tax increases with the level of the foreign tax. Finally, 
the last term, the imperfect competition effect, is negative by (6) and (7), which implies that 
the optimal domestic tax decreases with the degree of imperfect competition. This effect 
captures the tax adjustment associated with sub-optimal production levels under oligopoly. 
Solving tˆi and tˆ j simultaneously yields the equilibrium tax for country i : 
( ) yi P � i iti ∗ = si + s j D� + . (12)exyi 
The equilibrium tax for country i in (12) depends on two terms: (i) the total marginal 
damage of domestic production on the global environment; and (ii) the tax correction 
necessary to achieve efﬁcient oligopoly pricing. Notice that the ﬁrst term of (12) reﬁnes the 
optimal Pigouvian tax rule to encompass various cases of rival and non-rival externalities. In 
particular, the optimal tax reduces to the conventional Pigouvian tax (t = D�) under a rival 
externality, whereas, for a non-rival externality, the optimal tax rule is assessed according to 
the sum of marginal damages.9 The cooperative tax rate is set to correct for two distortions 
with a single instrument, as the market is characterized both by over-production due to 
the negative externality and under-production due to the oligopoly structure. Consequently, 
the optimal cooperative policy levies a second-best tax below marginal external damage. 
Indeed, one can not even rule out the seemingly perverse outcome in which the second-
best tax rate in (12) is negative (i.e., a subsidy), which corresponds with the observation 
originally made by Barnett (1980) that imperfectly competitive, but polluting ﬁrms may 
under-produce from the social perspective. 
When the optimal tax rule is derived at the trade union level, producers in each country 
iinternalize both the share of domestic environmental damage (si ) and the share of foreign 
environmental damage (sij ) associated with domestic production. Thus, the optimal tax in 
(12) does not take into account the location where damage occurs, but rather considers only 
responsibility for the damage. 
The cooperative policy implication of each of the various forms of asymmetry in the model 
depends in an important fashion on the dimension in which trading countries differ. For the 
case of asymmetric production costs, the optimal cooperative tax in (12) is non-harmonized 
across countries; that is, a necessary condition for (4) to hold when Cyi � �= Cyj is that yi ∗ = y ∗ j . 
[∫ ] 
Conversely, for the case in which ﬁrms in each country have identical production costs, 
the optimal cooperative tax rate is harmonized across countries, t∗ = t∗ j , even when other i 
forms of asymmetry exist. For any speciﬁcation of the consumer and producer distributions 
across countries, and for any speciﬁcation of the transboundary pollution ﬂow, a cooperative 
policy of tax harmonization is optimal whenever ﬁrms have equal production costs. This is 
because each ﬁrm releases an identical amount of emissions into the global environment 
i i j jwhen production costs are symmetric, s = si + s j j + si . 
It is important to note, however, that the global welfare maximum may lie outside the core 
of the Nash equilibrium under asymmetric market conditions. In particular, under various 
speciﬁcations of the transboundary pollution ﬂow the maximum global welfare solution is 
likely to result in higher welfare for one country and lower welfare for another. For example, 
consider the case of symmetric production costs and a unidirectional externality that satisﬁes 
S = (0, 0, 1, 1). In this case, the optimal cooperative emissions tax is a harmonized policy 
that unambiguously reduces welfare in country 1 due to full exportation of external effects 
to country 2. Hence, the cooperative outcome may be feasible in multilateral agreements 
only to the extent that transfer payments are possible (see, e.g., Markusen, 1975; Hoel, 
1991; and Chander and Tulkens, 1995) or when threats of economic sanctions are credible 
(Carraro and Siniscalco, 1998). 
5. Optimal Emission Taxes in the Non-Cooperative Case 
When regulatory authority is housed at the national level, each country views its optimal 
tax as the outcome of a non-cooperative game. Each country now considers only its own 
agents in the maximization of its domestic welfare. In conventional strategic trade model, 
consumption in producing countries is often suppressed for the interest of tractability; 
however, the following observation, which we prove in the appendix, allows consumer 
surplus to be conveniently incorporated in the domestic welfare calculation: 
Observation. With globally homogeneous consumers, if country i’s share of the consumer 
population is αi , then consumer surplus in country i, CSi , satisﬁes CSi = αiCS, where CS 
is consumer surplus derived from global demand. 
Because the international market is characterized by homogeneous consumers and a single 
market price, a domestic input tax that changes the production cost of domestic ﬁrms 
affects all consumers in the trade union equally through the equilibrium adjustment in 
the international market price. Hence, following a change in tax policy in one country, 
the change in consumer surplus is identical across countries on a per domestic consumer 
basis.10 This observation allows a convenient interpretation of the terms-of-trade of country 
i , which can now be written as the net trade balance, αi Y − ni yi , where αi Y is domestic 
consumption and ni yi is domestic production. 
The objective function of a national regulator can now be expressed as 
Y 
Max Wi = αi P(U ) dU − P(Y )Y + ni [P(Y )yi − Ci (yi , q(ti ))] − D(Ei ) + ti ni exi . 
ti 0 
(13) 
By (4) and Shephard’s Lemma (Cq = xi ), the ﬁrst-order condition yields 
(αi Y − ni yi ) ∂Y P � ∂y j i ∂ti n j xy j ∂ti j yi P � tˆi = si D� + + si D� + . (14)∂ yi ∂yini exyi ni xyi exyi∂ti ∂ti 
Expression (14) is the implicit reaction function of country i and describes the structure of 
ithe equilibrium tax.11 In (14), si D� is the share of marginal damages incurred in country i 
from its domestic production, which we henceforth refer to as the generalized Pigouvian tax 
ilevel (GPT). In the polar cases of a local externality or a non-rival externality, si D� = D� , 
and the GPT corresponds with a conventional Pigouvian tax. 
It is important to note that the conventional Pigouvian tax rate may or may not be efﬁ­
icient. In (14), a national regulator considers only domestic marginal damage, si D�, rather 
i ithan the global marginal damage induced by domestic production, (si + s j )D�, that ap­
pears in the optimal cooperative tax (11), terms that coincide only in the case of a local 
externality. 
In general, the optimal tax set by a national regulator is equal to the GPT plus three 
additional terms that denote, respectively, a terms-of-trade effect, a transboundary pollution 
effect, and an imperfect competition effect. For clarity, we consider each effect in turn. 
Consider, ﬁrst, the case of balanced trade (αi Y = ni yi ) and no transboundary effects 
i(s j = 0). In this case, the optimal tax modiﬁes the GPT only by the last term in (14), 
the imperfect competition effect, so that the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative tax 
rates coincide. This leads to an observation that is often misunderstood in the literature: a 
country that attempts to correct two distortions with a single instrument does not necessarily 
practice eco-dumping when the tax is set below the GPT level. Indeed, the reduction in the 
non-cooperative tax rate under balanced trade is exactly that which is necessary to achieve 
efﬁcient pricing under oligopoly from a global welfare perspective. 
Consider next the case of balanced trade with transboundary pollution effects. In this case, 
the transboundary effect adjusts the optimal domestic tax rate downward to account for the 
ineffectiveness of unilateral tax policy to internalize global environmental damages. This 
term reﬂects a pollution crowding-out effect. By (6), the decrease in domestic production 
under a domestic tax is at least partially offset by an increase in foreign production (and 
pollution), and, consequently, under any form of transboundary pollution effect, the GPT is 
discounted to prevent increased foreign pollution inﬂows from offsetting the domestic wel­
fare gain. In the non-cooperative case, transboundary damages result in non-harmonized tax 
rates across countries when s � sj = ij , i.e., whenever the trade balance in pollution emissions is i 
non-zero. In general, the net importer of pollution sets a lower tax than the net exporter as an 
incentive to increase domestic production, but, in equilibrium, both countries set taxes below 
the GPT level. 
Finally, consider the terms-of-trade effect. By (8) and (9), the sign of the terms-of-trade 
effect is positive whenever country i is a net exporter, αi Y − ni yi < 0, and negative when 
country i is a net importer. The effect is similar to that identiﬁed in the capital tax literature 
as a negative ﬁscal externality from tax exportation (see, e.g., Dixit, 1985; Burgess, 1988). 
A net exporting country has an incentive to set a tax greater than the GPT level, because a 
portion of the tax is shifted into price where it disproportionately affects foreign consumers. 
Indeed, in the extreme case in which there is no consumer base in country i , a situation that 
Figure 1. Tax equilibrium under asymmetry (2-country case). 
corresponds to conditions under a third country assumption, the optimal non-cooperative 
tax rate is adjusted upwards relative to that in the cooperative case.12 
It is helpful to consider the terms-of-trade effect in some detail. Suppose there are no 
transboundary pollution effects and all consumption takes place within the two producing 
countries. Suppose further, with no loss of generality, that that country 1 is the net exporter. 
In this case, the model assumptions are sufﬁciently general so that the slopes of the reaction 
curves are of ambiguous signs. Figure 1 shows the case for which reaction functions are 
positively sloped, which corresponds with the case in which taxes are strategic complements. 
In the ﬁgure, the cooperative solution to a non-rival externality problem is at point G, while 
the cooperative optimum in the case of a rival externality is at point P . Thus, the segment 
[P, G] represents all the possible cooperative solutions in our model. In the non-cooperative 
case, when country 2 is at the zero tax position, t2 = 0, country 1 sets its tax above the GPT 
level, because of the positive terms-of-trade effect. Similarly, when country 1 is at the zero 
tax position, t1 = 0, country 2 sets its tax below the GPT level. 
Next, suppose that both countries simultaneously engage in a green tax reform (i.e., 
t1, t2 > 0). In this case, the imposition of a tax by country j improves the trade position of 
country i through the trade balance effect, as 
∂(α i Y − ni yi ) 
< 0, (15)
∂ti 
where the inequality in (15) holds by (6) and (7). The implication of (15) is that each 
country has an incentive to raise the tax above the level they would have chosen in the case 
of unilateral taxation; hence, the reaction functions slope upward. At the non-cooperative 
equilibrium point in Figure 1, E , country 1 sets a tax above the GPT level, whereas country 2 
may or may not. This result contrasts with the conventional result of symmetric Cournot-
Nash duopoly models, in which all countries set taxes equal to or below the GPT level. 
Here, environmental dumping is not a universal outcome under duopoly, as a net-exporting 
country may set a tax that is higher than in the cooperative case. 
We now turn to the case in which multiple effects inﬂuence the optimal domestic tax 
policy in (14). In general, the range of circumstances in which an exporting country sets 
a tax greater than the GPT level is now reduced, as the imperfect competition effect and 
transboundary effect provide opposing incentives against the positive terms-of-trade effect. 
In this case, the critical value of each reaction function is an important indicator of whether 
the equilibrium tax in the country is ultimately set above or below the GPT level. More 
precisely, an intercept above the conventional Pigouvian tax level is a sufﬁcient condition 
for the equilibrium tax to exceed D� when taxes are strategic complements. For this reason, 
in an imperfectly competitive industry with an arbitrarily small terms-of-trade effect, the 
equilibrium tax of each country lies below the GPT level, a standard ﬁnding in analyses of 
symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The paper discussed optimal environmental tax policies for a general class of asymmetric 
international equilibria. A principle ﬁnding is that differences in industry size and production 
costs and/or the distribution of consumers across countries have profound effects on the 
calculation of the optimal tax and the resulting tax revenue. The optimal cooperative tax 
was found to depend on marginal environmental damages from domestic production on the 
global environment as well as on an imperfect competition effect, such that asymmetries 
in production costs lead to circumstances in which harmonization of taxes across countries 
is sub-optimal. In contrast, asymmetries across countries dimensioned in the number of 
consumers or in the distribution of transboundary pollution damages favor cooperative 
policies of tax harmonization. 
The optimal non-cooperative tax was shown to depend on three effects: a terms-of-trade 
effect, a transboundary pollution effect, and an imperfect competition effect. For certain 
values of the market parameters, the optimal tax for a net exporting nation exceeded the 
Pigouvian tax level regardless of the incentive of a domestic regulator to shift rent in the 
international market. 
When trade balances are non-zero, environmental policy distortions occur in a trade union 
that establishes environmental policy in a non-cooperative setting. Lax environmental taxes 
that result in environmental dumping by all trading countries are more likely to occur for 
externalities that are associated with non-rival and transboundary forms of pollution effects. 
However, even in such circumstances, environmental dumping is not a universal outcome; 
for various values of the market parameters the optimal policy for a net exporting nation is 
to set an inefﬁciently high tax. 
The model suggests several directions for future research. In the non-cooperative case, an 
implication of the model is that a national regulator is more likely to improve domestic wel­
fare by setting emission taxes in net exporting sectors of the economy than in net importing 





national or regional trade balances and environmental taxation. The fact that the optimal 
tax rate is higher for a net exporter than for a net importer also has interesting implications 
for what has become known as the “pollution haven” hypothesis: the idea that capital in­
vestment in “dirty” industries may ﬂow to countries with lax environmental regulations. 
Such an outcome, which is a theoretical prediction of many models with endogenous ﬁrm 
location, has for the most part lacked empirical corroboration. In a dynamic formulation of 
the present model, in which the optimal non-cooperative tax is an endogenous function of 
the trade balance, such a relocation and/or investment pattern is likely to be dynamically 
inconsistent. If, following the investment and relocation decisions of ﬁrms, the optimal 
environmental tax rate increases with the migration of polluting industries through positive 
changes in terms-of-trade, “pollution havens” would be unlikely to persist. 
Appendix 
This appendix contains the proof of our observation. Deﬁne individual utility such that 
U = U (y) + m, where y is the quantity of a consumption good that is produced using a 
polluting input, and m is the numeraire. Individual consumer surplus is 
y 
cs = Uy(y) − Py  = Pi (y˜) d y˜ − Py, 
0 
where Pi (y) is the inverse demand of individual i . Households have identical utility. Hence, 
when one household is willing to buy y units of a good at price P, n households are willing 
to buy ny units of a good at price P , which implies 
Pi (y) = P(ny) = P(Y ), 
where P(Y ) is global inverse demand, which in this case corresponds to the trade union. 
Assuming there are n homogeneous individuals in the union, global consumer surplus is 
y 
CS ≡ n(cs) = n Pi (y˜) d y˜ − Py  , 
0 
Also, global consumer surplus can be expressed as the area above the price line and below 
the world demand curve, 
Y 
CS = P(Y˜ ) dY˜ − PY  
0 
Let denote the share of consumers in the trade union that are located in country i . Equating 
(1) and (2), consumer surplus in country i satisﬁes 
Y
 
CSi = αi n(cs) = αi P(Y˜ ) dY˜ − PY  = αiCS
 
0 
which completes the proof. 
Notes 
1.	 These papers consider strategic environmental policy with exogenous ﬁrm location. International environmen­
tal policy has also been examined under conditions of endogenous location. For example, Rauscher (1995) 
analyses environmental policy in a context where the level of regulation inﬂuences the location of polluting 
industries. 
2.	 In many transboundary pollution problems, the shared environmental medium may not be well-mixed. For 
example, jet streams and river currents often ﬂow in a single direction across national boundaries, which creates 
a situation of unilateral inﬂow (outﬂow) of air and water pollutants. 
3.	 Ulph (1998) also ﬁnds that environmental tax harmonization can have adverse welfare consequences; however, 
his result depends on different environmental damage costs across countries, a situation not considered here. 
4.	 The model is presented as a partial equilibrium analysis, but, implicitly, we are assuming that trade balance is 
achieved behind the scenes by the existence of another traded good produced by a purely competitive industry. 
5.	 Currently, most world trade is characterized by intra-industry trade ﬂows, especially in high-income countries 
(see, e.g., Ethier (1995, pp. 33–36)). 
6.	 Constant marginal damages are imposed here for expositional convenience, as this allows global damages to 
be expressed in terms of the shares of pollution produced and consumed in each country. Sufﬁcient conditions 
to make this interpretation are D�(0) = 0 and D���(.) = 0, from which derives the property that D�(x + y) = 
D�(x) + D�(y). With a more general speciﬁcation of the environmental damage function, the qualitative 
implication of each effect identiﬁed in this paper would remain unchanged, although new terms would appear 
in the tax calculations resulting from non-convexities in the global damage function. 
7.	 We conceive of a local externality here as a rival externality that occurs entirely in the source country. That is, 
a rival effect is a necessary, but not a sufﬁcient, condition for a local externality. 
8.	 In both the cooperative and non-cooperative cases, we consider circumstances in which lump sum transfers 
are possible. As a referee points out, extension of the model to second-best policy considerations would open 
up interesting possibilities for a double dividend effect to exist. 
9.	 For an externality with both rival and non-rival effects, the optimal tax would satisfy D� < t < 2D� . 
10. As an editor of the Journal points out, the usefulness of our observation can be seen through comparison to the 
situation facing a cartel. In the basic cartel problem, the share of aggregate industry proﬁt of each ﬁrm is an 
endogenous function of the choice variables. Here, the share of domestic consumers (and the associated share of 
consumer surplus) is exogenous to the regulator’s decision, which allows the share of global consumer surplus 
to be substituted for the domestic surplus measure prior to maximization. If the policy under consideration here 
was a tax on domestic sales, as opposed to an input tax, then the policy impact to consumers would depend 
on the country of origin, and, consequently, consumer surplus shares would be endogenous as in the case of 
cartel ﬁrms. 
11. As in Conrad (1996), it is necessary to study the optimal tax structure without explicitly solving for the 
equilibrium taxes. However, because the equilibrium point is an intersection of two reaction functions, the 
implicit structure of (14) is preserved at the equilibrium point. Throughout, we refer to tˆi as the optimal tax, 
but the reader should keep this distinction in mind. 
12. In this case, the tax rate in (14) is comprised of the GPT, plus two additional terms that represent a decomposition 
of the conventional ‘rent-shifting’ effect into an extreme positive correction for terms-of-trade and a well-known 
subsidization rule for efﬁcient pricing under oligopoly. 
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